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Abstract. The reuse of reliable, domain-specific software components is a 
strategy commonly used in the avionics industry to develop safety critical 
airborne systems. One method of achieving reuse is to use domain specific 
languages that map closely onto abstractions in the problem domain. While this 
works well for control algorithms, it is less successful for some complex 
ancillary functions such as failure management. The characteristics of device 
failures are often difficult to predict resulting in late requirements changes. 
Hence a small semantic gap is especially desirable but difficult to achieve. 
Object-oriented design techniques include mechanisms, such as inheritance, 
that cater well for variations in behaviour. However, object-oriented notations 
such as the UML lack the precision, and rigor, needed for safety critical 
software. UML-B is a profile of the UML for formal modelling. In this paper 
we show how UML-B can be used to model failure management systems via 
progressive refinement, and indicate how this approach could utilise UML 
concepts to cope with high variability, while providing rigorous verification.  
1 Introduction 
Developers in the avionics industry are interested in the use of object-orientated 
technology (OOT) [1, 2] as a way to increase productivity. In particular, concepts, 
such as inheritance and design patterns, enable more flexible reuse of software. The 
emergence of the UML [3] as the de-facto standard modelling language for object-
oriented design and analysis, and the subsequent development of supporting tools, has 
promoted the modelling and design of applications in the UML. Due to concerns over 
safety certification issues, OOT has not seen widespread use in avionics applications. 
One reason for this is that the controlling standards used in the industry, such as 
RTCA DO-178B [6] and its European equivalent, EUROCAE ED-12B [7], do not 
consider OOT. In order to address this, a new version of the standard, DO-178C/ED 
12C, is planned. A significant contribution to this new standard will come from the 
findings of the Object Orientated Technology in Aviation (OOTiA) initiative [8], 
which was set up by the FAA and NASA to develop guidelines for the safe use of 
object-oriented technology in avionics software development.  
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RODIN (Rigorous Open Development Environment for Complex Systems).  Application development based on a combination of UML and formal methods will 
improve safety and provide flexibility in the design of software for aviation 
certification. The combination of UML and formal methods at an abstract modelling 
stage will enable the reuse of reliable software components both at the specification 
and code levels. We indicate how we can exploit the reuse features of the UML and 
the reliability provided by formal methods. The development process will benefit 
from a reduction in the semantic gap by defining a vocabulary of entities that maps 
closely onto abstractions in the problem domain. UML class diagrams assist greatly 
with this, especially in complex application domains where the use of features such as 
inheritance caters for variation of subtypes. The use of formal methods to address the 
rigorous verification required for safety critical applications has been advocated 
before [5] but adoption within industry has been limited partly due to the need for 
industrial strength tool support. One formal method that has been developed for 
practical use in industry and enjoys good tool support is the B method [9]. 
1.1  B and B tools 
The B method is based on a set theoretic approach and provides the ability to perform 
rigorous proof, thus ensuring a self-consistent specification. The B method’s Abstract 
Machine Notation (AMN) is used to describe the state and behaviour. Under-
specification in assignments or choices is possible via non-deterministic constructs, 
which must be resolved in later refinements prior to implementation. An invariant 
clause describes properties of the system that must hold at all times. The B 
verification tools [11] generate proof obligations (POs) and then attempt to 
automatically discharge (prove) them. Invariably there are a number of PO’s that 
remain to be discharged semi-automatically using the interactive prover [10]. The 
user guides the proof by suggesting strategies and sub-goals. Discharging POs with 
the interactive prover often leads to a greater insight into the specification and 
inaccuracies can be identified and addressed at an early stage of development. 
Discharging proof obligations can be difficult and time consuming, but once complete 
the specification is known to be self-consistent. A model checker, ProB [13], that 
searches for deadlocks and invariant violations may be used as a preliminary 
verification of the specification before commencing proof. Refinements are related to 
the previous level of abstraction in such a way that a valid refinement always satisfies 
the abstract specification. Proof provides confidence that the refinement is not only 
self-consistent but also reflects the behaviour of the abstract specification it refines. 
Event B [12] is a derivation of the original B Method that uses the notion of predicate 
guards that enable or disable events. The event driven approach of Event B begins 
with the abstraction of the observable events that ‘may’ occur in a system. The 
abstraction is refined in a number of steps, adding new events and state information at 
each iteration. The aim is to move towards a consistent model, with enough detail to 
fully describe the behaviour of the system. There are a number of additional 
requirements for the event driven approach, firstly, the added events of a refinement 
are not allowed to permanently take control of the system so that the events of the 
more abstract model are eventually enabled; secondly, a concrete event must not be 
enabled more often than its abstract counterpart; but the abstract event must not be   
enabled more than the disjunction of the concrete event together with the new events. 
That is, the abstract event is replaced by a sequence of new events culminating in the 
refined event. 
Validation of specifications is just as important as verification. ProB [13] can also be 
used to animate B machines. The list of currently enabled operations is displayed in a 
pane. The current state of variables is displayed in another pane. The user may choose 
sequences of enabled operations in order to explore the behaviour of the specification. 
2 Failure  management   
A common functionality required of many systems is to manage failure of its inputs. 
This is particularly pertinent in aviation applications where lack of tolerance to failed 
system inputs could lead to loss of aircraft. The role of failure management in an 





























Fig. 1. Context diagram for failure management subsystem 
 
The inputs are tested and, if good, are passed unaltered to the control subsystem; 
otherwise the failure of the input is managed. This may involve substituting values, 
and taking alternative actions. There are two aspects to the subsystem; detection and 
remedial action. Failure detection involves checking for input validity, including out 
of range checks, rate of change checks, and comparison with other conditions in the 
system. A failed condition must persist for a period of time before a failure is 
confirmed. If the invalid condition is not confirmed the input recovers and is used 
again. When setting the persistence conditions for confirmation of a failure, a balance 
must be sought between achieving a fast response to failures and over sensitivity to 
spurious interference. Once a failure is confirmed it is latched until power is reset. 
Remedial actions vary, depending on the input’s function and importance within the 
system, and the state of the system when the failure occurred. Temporary remedial 
actions, such as relying on the last good value, or suppressing control behaviour, may 
be taken while a failure is being confirmed. Once a failure is confirmed, more 
permanent actions are taken such as switching to an alternative source, altering or 
degrading the method of control, engaging a backup system or freezing the controlled 
equipment. Tables 1 and 2, show some typical failure management activities. Table 1. Detection 
Signal  High  Low  Rate  Conditions for test 
120% 0%  100%/sec  Engine Stood 
120% 10% 100%/sec  Engine  Starting  ESa 
120% 50% 100%/sec  Engine  Running 
120% 0%  100%/sec  Engine Stood 
120% 10% 100%/sec  Engine  Starting  ESb 
120% 50% 100%/sec  Engine  Running 
ESa - ESb  5%  -5%  -  ESa or ESb >30%  
ESa – Engine speed (main input) 
ESb – Engine speed (alternative input) 
Table 2. Remedial Actions 
Signal  Procedure  code 
Select ESb if available  ESa 
else Switch to backup system 
ES1 
ESb  ESb not available  ES2 
ESa/ESb diff  Use highest value sensor  ES3 
 
Experience has shown that failure management systems can be difficult, and 
expensive, to develop and maintain due to their complexity and vulnerability to 
change. Changes often occur late in the development cycle, since requirements are 
redefined based on empirical performance under failure conditions. The semantic gap 
between control algorithm design notations and coding constructs has been addressed 
successfully by the development of domain specific languages. Unlike control 
algorithms failure management has no successful domain specific language. The 
nature of failure management is that different control actions and behaviour are 
required, dependent on the outcome of conditional logic for each of many inputs; this 
can result in complex overall behaviour. Failure management can become 
functionally complex due to the following:  the rate of decay of an input depends on 
sensor device characteristics, the application of a test depends on engine and input 
conditions, a test may depend on the sampling rates of inputs, a test may vary 
according to outcomes of other tests, the detection of a failure may require hysteresis 
to avoid oscillation, the sequence of tests may depend on temporal interdependence of 
input sampling, remedial actions depend on the system state. 
One approach, to improve flexibility, is to model a failure management subsystem 
using the UML; this will improve configurability and, if combined with formal 
methods to ensure consistency, will be particularly suited to the safety critical 
applications found in aviation. Modelling functional behaviour will provide the 
ontology to convey functional understanding and, through formal techniques, provide 
a way to map this to the code, reducing the semantic gap.  6 Future  work 
This paper describes our first attempt using an event based modelling approach, with 
UML-B, to improve the reusability and portability of failure management systems. 
We are in the preliminary stages of a three-year research programme that aims to 
investigate this area. Within the project we will develop UML-B, to better support the 
use of UML features such as inheritance, and to provide modelling mechanisms that 
aid the refinement and transformation of UML-B models. We plan to re-implement 
the U2B translator within eclipse in order to achieve better integration with the B 
validation and verification tools, which will also be ported to eclipse. We will test and 
develop the ideas presented in this paper, on a larger scale example, in the following 
stages. Model a small but realistic, imaginary failure management application.  The 
model may consist of several levels of refinement but be platform independent. We 
will then validate and verify the model via translation to B. Following validation and 
verification; we will investigate methods for abstracting away from the specific 
example to obtain a generic UML-B model that is application independent. New ideas 
for the development, using B# [20], may be used in this stage. Further development of 
UML-B and U2B may be needed to support this kind of model. Finally, we will 
investigate mechanisms for model transformation to obtain application and domain 
specific models from the generic model. 
7 Conclusions 
In this paper we have illustrated an approach to rigorous development of critical 
complex systems, such as failure management, in a manner that results in a high 
degree of re-usable verified components.  The approach provides rigorous consistency 
verification through a sequence of refinement steps starting from a very abstract 
expression of overall system behaviour. This process of refinement can be continued 
through requirements development, design and into implementation. The process 
involves a, UML based, formal modelling notation, UML-B and utilises the tools 
available for the formal notation B. The refinement process inherently provides a high 
degree of reuse of verified specifications due to the deferment of specific application 
details. The genericity features of the UML may be used to provide re-usable 
common components within each refinement level. In this way we hope to provide a 
library of component classes that have a flexible but simple mapping with application 
domain concepts. The hierarchy of class models can then be instantiated with an 
object model for different applications thus achieving a specification and 
implementation language with small semantic gap that is suitable for the target 
complex problem domain; in this case, failure management systems. This approach 
could similarly be used for other complex systems problems. 
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